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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is currently acknowledged, among Hume scholars interested in modern philosophy 
of action, that his theory of the motives to action was some kind of belief-desire theory – 
which refers to what is today called “folk psychology”. Of course, the relative parts of belief 
and desire, as well as their respective contents, have been subject to constant discussion1. But 
the framework of the theory has not been seriously threatened. For economists interested in 
decision theory, this is also quite familiar: it is clear that we have a belief-desire theory as 
well, in which “belief” stands for something like probability, and “desire” for preferences.  
In this respect, we should have some good argument favouring the idea that, for 
instance, the expected utility theory is Humean, just because the Savageian “principle of the 
sure thing” achieves a separation between the world of belief (where reason is required to tell 
us if such belief is true or false) and the world of desire (where reason alone is impotent). In 
the same way, the role played by pleasure and pain within Hume’s works shouldn’t seem so 
odd according to usual standards of decision theory – provided we view them with sufficient 
indulgence: at least at first sight, this role seems rather similar to the one played by utility. We 
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1 For instance, a standard interpretation which allows numerous variants (see Jonathan Harrison 1976, Michael 
Smith 1987, or Elizabeth Radcliffe 1999) asserts that action is motivated by the pair belief-desire, and that 
belief alone is insufficient to have the same effect. Other commentators, on the contrary, argue that some 
beliefs are motives to action (Ingmar Persson 1997), or that belief (or, at least, believing) is in some way 
similar to passion (Barry Stroud 1977, pp. 160 sqq.).  
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know that this last can be considered, independently of its possible content, as a 
representation of preordered and continuous preference and, consequently, of the possible 
choice function that it would rationalize (that is, of the choice function whose selected 
elements correspond to the best elements with respect to the previous preference). As a 
consequence, it seems possible to argue that pleasure and pain, in a Humean framework, 
represent desire and will, just like utility represents preferences and choices. 
Now, both pleasure and belief were minor issues in our previous article on David 
Hume’s theory of choice (M.-A. Diaye and A. Lapidus 2005a). In this paper, we discussed the 
rationality of a Humean decision process without explicit references to the role of either 
pleasure or belief. Drawing on Hume’s writings, we built there an algorithm of choice called 
D-PROC. From step to step, in D-PROC, the set of choice X, the domain of choice F 
(constituted by a set of non-empty subsets S of X, interpreted as “contexts of choice”, or 
“opportunity sets”, or “budgets”, or “consumption sets”, according to alternative 
terminologies), along with the related contextual preferences RS (over S), general preferences 
R (over X), and choice functions C(S) (defined from F to P(X) the set of all subsets of X), are 
revised, allowing for rather general conditions. However, D-PROC displays, as a possible 
outcome, rationality in two different senses (the second one being stronger than the first), 
which seem to grasp the intuitive meanings of the word in standard theory of choice under 
certainty1. The first kind of rationality which constitutes a possible outcome of D-PROC is 
the rationality of the choice function (see proposition 1 in Diaye and Lapidus 2005a, p. 105), 
that is, the consistency between choices and preferences in the sense where an agent, 
alternatively facing various contexts of choice S, would always choose what he prefers 
according to his or her general preferences R. More formally, the rationality of a choice 
function C(S) means that this latter can be rationalized by a binary relation R over X, such 
that for all S belonging to F, the set of optimal elements of S with respect to R being G(S, R) 
= {x ∈ S : xRy, ∀ y ∈ S}, C(S) = G(S, R). The second kind of rationality which might be 
produced by D-PROC is the rationality of the preference relation (see proposition 2 in Diaye 
and Lapidus 2005a, p. 106), which means that preferences are preordered. In other words, R is 
complete, (that is, for all x, y belonging to X, x R y or y R x) and transitive (that is, for 
all x, y, z belonging to X, x R y and y R z ⇒ x R z). Rationality of the preference relation 
appears as the effect of a stabilization property of the decision process, when the agent is no 
more inclined to revise his or her preferences.  
A purpose of this paper is therefore to reintroduce pleasure and belief in their due 
place, in what aims at being a Humean theory of decision. The case of pleasure deserves 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion, see Diaye and Lapidus 2005a, pp. 91-3. 
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special consideration (section 2). In the following, we support the idea that Hume was in 
some way – evidently different from Bentham’s or Jevons’ way – a hedonist. However, the 
emphasis should be put less on what is shared by Hume and Bentham, than on the specific 
kind of hedonism encountered in Hume’s writings (chiefly the Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739-40), the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), the Dissertation on the 
Passions (1757), or in some of his Essays (1777)): 
• Pleasure does represent desire but, in contrast to utility in its relation to 
preferences, it is because the latter (desire) is generated by the former (pleasure) – 
and not the reverse.  
• Again in contrast to utility in its relation to preferences, the order between goods 
which is reflected on desires can move away from the relation between goods 
generated by pleasure. In other words, whereas the goods that grant us the greatest 
utility are also those which we prefer, what pleases us the most is not necessarily 
what we desire the most1. 
 
The reason for such a difference with the usual modern approach lies in the mental 
process that Hume puts to the fore in order to explain the way by which pleasure determines 
desires and volition. And here, we meet again the other missing element from our previous 
picture of Hume’s theory of choice – belief (section 3). Belief helps to make the crucial 
difference that Hume establishes between two different meanings of “pleasure”, as an 
impression and as an idea. Whereas pleasure is primarily an impression of sensation, it takes 
place in the birth of passions as reflecting an idea of pleasure, whose “force and vivacity” is 
precisely a “belief”. Now, such a belief is transferred to the direct passions2 of desire or 
volition which come immediately before action. This has a puzzling consequence: when we 
speak of “belief” from a Humean point of view, our use of the word is rather different from 
the one usually acknowledged, either in current language or in economic decision theory, 
since it is no more exclusively related to decision under risk or uncertainty, but it might also 
express, for instance, the discounting of future goods or the lack of discrimination between 
different elements of the choice context. The latter is explored within a formal framework, 
and it is shown that the relation of pleasure is transformed by belief into a class of relations of 
                                                 
1 Hume expresses this idea by writing, for instance, that a “trivial good [that is, a lesser pleasure; M;-A.D and 
A.L.] may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most 
valuable enjoyment”. (Hume 1739-40:, II, p. 416) 
2 According to Hume, the “direct passions” are joy and grief, hope and fear, desire and aversion, and will or 
volition. They “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (Hume 1739-40, II, p. 276). The 
direct passions in relation to decision theory are discussed in Diaye and Lapidus 2005a, pp. 93-6, and in 
Lapidus 2000, pp. 12-20. But for a more general account, see Páll Árdal 1966, chapters 1, 2, and 5. 
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desire, among which at least one is a preorder. This allows establishing a link between the 
pleasure-belief operation and the Humean decision process D-PROC described in Diaye and 
Lapidus 2005a: pleasure and belief can express themselves through contextual preferences at 
each step of a decision process which, when completed, becomes rational. 
2. PLEASURE AS AN IMPRESSION  
2.1. The Impression of Pleasure: A Pre-Benthamite Analysis 
Like Bentham, Hume might be viewed as a hedonist when he claimed, nearly in the 
same terms as his follower, that “[t]here is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain 
and pleasure as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions” (Hume 1739-40, I, 
p. 118)1 or, in the second Enquiry, when he imagined the successive questions which might 
be asked to a man to understand what motivated him to do some physical exercise (Hume 
1751, p. 293). The answers went on, from health to occupation, then to money. But two 
typical answers only could terminate the sequence: the avoidance of pain (an “ultimate end”, 
said Hume) and the search for pleasure (“beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason”). 
Of course, Hume did not enter into as many details as the author of the Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation did2, but we have evidence that he had some rough 
intuition of pleasure as a scalar magnitude (let us denote it by p), non-negative (p ≥ 0) when it 
concerns pleasure strictly speaking, and negative (p < 0) in the case of pain. This magnitude 
depends on:  
a) the context of choice S which our passions lead us to consider, and which is here 
supposed to be included in Rn+, where n stands for the number of objects;  
b) the element x belonging to S which gives rise to pleasure or pain (x is a vector of 
quantities; when comparing two vectors x = (x1,…,xn) and y = (y1,…,yn) belonging 
to S (subset of Rn+), we will state x ≥ y if xi ≥ xi for any i = 1,…,n, with at least one 
strict inequality, and x > y if xi> xi for any i = 1,…,n);  
c) and our emotional state, typically illustrated by what Hume calls the ‘degree of 
violence’ of the passions denoted v and belonging to R+. 
                                                 
1 Compare to the well-known sentence by which Bentham began the Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure” (Bentham 1789, p. 1). 
2 Bentham described in chapter IV of his work (Bentham 1789, pp. 29-30) some elementary arithmetic 
operations which allow the calculation of a quantity of pleasure associated to an act on the basis of its 
“intensity”, “duration”, “certainty or uncertainty’, and “propinquity or remoteness”.  
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.  
On the basis of the above points a), b), and c), we can write the real-valued function which 
determines pleasure as: 
p = pS (x, v)  [2.1] 
We will discuss hereafter the variables involved in [2.1] and the properties of the function of 
pleasure pS.  
It is obvious, from a Humean point of view, that the objects which are presumed to 
provide us pleasure or pain do not exist for us by the sole virtue of our reason and 
independently of our perceptions. They come to our mind with other objects as supports of 
our way to live the pleasure or the pain (i.e., in Hume’s words, our ‘passions’, ‘emotions’, or 
‘affections’) that they are supposed to give us. This contextual existence of objects, expressed 
by S, linked to an emotional state v, is introduced by Hume as a consequence of the inability 
of reason alone to let us know the objects that would potentially be submitted, afterwards, to 
our affections: 
“Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; and 
’tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its means that the 
objects are able to affect us” (Hume 1739-40, II, p. 414). 
So that a possible disagreement with a formulation like [2.1] might arise not from the 
contextual existence of objects which may give us pleasure or pain, but from the nature of the 
magnitude which represents pleasure, and from the part played by our emotional state. These 
two questions will be dealt with successively. 
For some commentators, indeed, a difficulty might arise, either from an irreducible 
heterogeneity of pleasures (see Pierre Demeulenaere 1996, pp. 36-7) which would render 
them definitely incomparable, or from the very nature of the part played by pleasure in the 
decision process. For instance, Norman Kemp Smith (1941, p. 164) denied, in his influential 
book, that Hume was a hedonist, and he considered pleasure and pain as efficient causes of 
action (among others), but not as final causes. It’s a fact that we can find (more often in the 
Treatise than in the Enquiries or in the Dissertation) some warnings, like the following, 
which take us away from an overly Benthamite reading: 
“[U]nder the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other, and 
which have only such a distant resemblance as is requisite to make them be expressed by the same 
abstract term” (Hume 1739-40, III, p. 472).  
But such warnings are usually subordinated to another purpose. For instance, the latter 
concerns the explanation of the differences between moral virtues, so that it is not obvious 
that it would be relevant in dealing with the motives to action. On the contrary, even the 
sentence which follows the above quotation, among many other examples, seems to announce 
Bentham’s future position: 
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“A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and what is more, 
their goodness is determin’d merely by the pleasure.” (Ibid.). 
Although the proximity between Hume and Bentham with regard to the determination 
of individual behaviour might be challenged from several other points of view – and we will 
challenge it too – we will accept for the time being the principle of the determining role of 
pleasure and of its measurability. From this point of view, it seems quite obvious that, 
provided the elements of S (included in Rn+) are defined correctly, pS (x, v) is monotonously 
increasing in x: 
∀ x, y ∈ S, if x > y then pS(x, v) > pS(y, v) [2.2] 
Nonetheless, the question of the emotional state, expressed by v in [2.1], will move us 
apart from an overly Benthamite interpretation. 
2.2. Happiness and the Pleasure-Response 
It would be an oversimplification to argue that Hume’s analysis of the impression of 
pleasure gives rise to an expression of pleasure within a specific context as depending only on 
the quantities of the goods concerned. In contrast to Bentham (although chapter VI of the 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Bentham 1789) might be used in 
favour of a more qualified reading), Hume considered that the pleasure-response given by 
such good also depends on our emotional state, exemplified by the degree of violence of the 
passions. The Treatise, like the Enquiries, is not as explicit on this relation as one would have 
expected it to be. A clearer insight of the question is given at the occasion of discussions 
about the link between pleasure and happiness1, in two essays2 that Hume first published in 
1742 and 1752 respectively. 
Indeed, it is neither in the Treatise nor in the Enquiries, but in the essay on the 
“Refinement in the Arts”3 that Hume introduces the elements whose interaction determines 
happiness: 
Human happiness […] seems to consist in three ingredients; action, pleasure, and indolence: And 
though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular 
disposition of the person; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in some 
                                                 
1 On the role of happiness (as distinct from both interest and desire) in the valuation of individual welfare from a 
Humean point of view, see Lapidus 2010. 
2 When Hume acknowledged that the Treatise did not receive the attention and success that it deserved, he 
published and revised, up to the posthumous edition of 1777, a collection of short contributions entitled Essays 
Moral, Political and Literary, where he tried to make available to his reader some essential features of his 
more academic works. 
3 For its first publication in the Essays, in 1752, this text was entitled “Of Luxury”. 
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measure, the relish of the whole composition. (Hume 1777, Of Refinement in the Arts [1752], pp. 269-
70) 
At first sight, this only seems to mean that pleasure is by itself insufficient to give rise 
to happiness. But the subsequent discussion shows that Hume’s position is not so obvious, 
since “action” and “indolence” do not stand at the same level as “pleasure”. If happiness does 
depend on action and indolence, it is because they influence our response, in terms of 
pleasure, to any solicitation of our senses. For instance, when the proportion excessively 
favours action, the “quick march of the spirits, which takes a man from himself, and chiefly 
gives satisfaction, does in the end exhaust the mind” (Ibid., p. 240). By contrast, when 
indolence predominates, it prompts “a languor and lethargy, that destroys all enjoyment” 
(Ibid.). Now, action and indolence were already related to the degree of violence of the 
passions in Hume’s essay on “The Sceptic”1: 
To be happy, the passion must neither be too violent nor too remiss. In the first case, the mind is in a 
perpetual hurry and tumult; in the second, it sinks into a disagreeable indolence and lethargy. (Hume 
1777, The Sceptic [1742], p. 167)   
This gives sense to indolence and action. They respectively correspond to two mental states, 
“lethargy” and “tumult”, and come along with two states of the passions, the one remiss, and 
the other violent.  
Although Hume’s main purpose in the above quoted passages from both the 
Refinement in the Arts and from the Sceptic was to explain what contributes to happiness, he 
also made obvious that he did not view the pleasure generated by an object as independent 
from the emotional state of the individual – that is, of the degree of violence of the passions 
which govern him. This gives meaning to the representation of a Humean function of 
pleasure, as suggested in [2.1]. However, Hume went further, asserting two conjectural 
properties to this function. 
The first property concerns the degree of violence of the passions. In Hume’s works, 
this question is usually related to intertemporal decision: the preference for present expresses 
what Hume called the “degree of violence of passions” (see Lapidus 2000, pp. 45-9; Davis 
2003; Palacios-Huerta 2003; Lapidus 2010). When the time preference is low, the passion is 
said to be “calm” in the Treatise (see, for example, Hume 1739-40, II, p. 418), the 
                                                 
1 First published in 1742, this essay is one of the four texts (“The Epicurean”, “The Stoic”, “The Platonist”, “The 
Sceptic”) in which Hume presents “sects, that naturally form themselves in the world, and entertain different 
ideas of human life and of happiness” (Hume 1777, The Epicurean [1742], p. 138 n. 1). The question of 
knowing whether this essay corresponds to Hume’s position is still discussed. We follow here John 
Immerwahr’s interpretation according to which, while none of the four essays fits perfectly with the theses 
developed in the Treatise, “The Sceptic” comes closest to them (Immerwahr 1989). The main differences noted 
by Immerwahr concern the possibility of an emotional control which could lead to happiness. 
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Dissertation (Hume 1757, p. 162) or the second Enquiry (Hume 1751, p. 239); and when it 
increases, the passion becomes more violent. But such a calm passion might also be viewed as 
the intermediate state described in the Sceptic, between the “remiss” and the “violent” 
passion. According to the above mentioned passages from the Essays, we might conclude that 
for Hume, the highest pleasure-response is produced by a calm passion. Allowing that the 
pleasure function pS(x, v) is differentiable in v and denoting vˆ  the degree of violence of the 
calm passion, this means that the partial derivative of pS with respect to v is positive as far as 
the passion is remiss (v < vˆ ), negative when it is violent (v > vˆ ), and zero when it is calm 
(v = vˆ ). That is to say, given S and x (belonging to S), pS(x, v) is at a maximum for a calm 
passion: 
Property 1: Maxima of the pleasure function with respect to the violence of passions 
Given S and x in S, ),(ˆ vxpArgMaxv S
v
≡  [2.3] 
The second property concerns the pleasure-response to the variations of the quantities 
x. It can be inferred from a passage of the Treatise (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 141-2) in which 
Hume compared the differences of the impressions between two pairs of amounts of money, 
that this difference is meaningful. In Hume’s example, it means that the difference in the 
impressions concerning three and two guineas, on the one hand, is greater than the difference 
in the impressions concerning one thousand and nine hundred ninety-nine guineas, on the 
other hand.  
• Generalizing Hume’s position, a first conclusion of this example is that for any v and for 
any (x, y) and (z, w) belonging to S×S,  
pS(x, v) - pS(y, v) ≥ pS(z, v) - pS(w, v) or pS(z, v) - pS(w, v) ≥ pS(x, v) - pS(y, v) 
Extending this assumption to the differences between pleasures generated by different 
values of v, and denoting ΔpS(x, y; v, v’) = pS(x, v) - pS(y, v’),  the previous condition can 
be rewritten: 
ΔpS(x, y; v, v’) ≥ ΔpS(z, w; v”, v’”) or ΔpS(z, w; v”, v’”) ≥ ΔpS(x, y; v, v’) [2.4]. 
Because pleasure differences are meaningful (see equation [2.4]), the Humean pleasure 
function  pS(.) can be considered as a cardinal function with normalized zero, that is, a 
function defined up to a positive linear transformation g (g(pS) = a pS, with a > 0). 
• Moreover, an obvious second conclusion is that if, as Hume argued, the difference of the 
impressions between three and two guineas is greater than the corresponding difference 
between one thousand and nine hundred ninety-nine guineas, pS(x,v) is concave with 
respect to x.  
The second property hence comes as follows: 
Property 2: Cardinality and concavity of the pleasure function 
pS (x, v) is  
i) cardinal with normalized zero; [2.5] 
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ii) concave with respect to x. 
Now, these two properties do not play the same part within Hume’s analysis. Property 
1 depends on a special Humean conjecture on the calm passion, namely the idea that there 
exists an emotional state that would not only lead us to the decisions that fit our interest the 
best, but would also provide us the greatest pleasure for each object. However, although this 
conjecture is crucial to understand Hume’s practical conception of interest and happiness (see 
Lapidus 2010), and justifies the importance that he granted to the calm passions in many 
fields of the social life (see John Immerwahr 1992), it seems far less important from the more 
general point of view of the decision theory which stems from his works. On the contrary, 
property 2 seems to grasp the very nature of the sensation of pleasure involved in this decision 
process. 
2.3. Indiscrimination and the Correspondence of Pleasure 
However, before going any further, let us stress a formal consequence of the mere 
existence of pS (x, v), even in the case where it does not satisfy properties 1 and 2. It is well 
known that if a function like the function of pleasure pS is defined on the context of choice S 
as above, and if S has some convenient property (for instance, if S is countable), it might be 
viewed as a representation of an underlying binary pleasure relation LS(v) depending on v. 
LS(v) being a non-empty subset of S×S, (x, y) ∈ LS(v) reads “given v, x pleases at least as 
much as y”, and can be alternatively and more conveniently written x LS(v) y. Asserting that 
the function of pleasure pS is a representation of the pleasure relation LS amounts to saying 
that it is an order homomorphism defined from (S, LS(v)) into (R, ≥): 
∀ x, y ∈ S, x LS(v) y ⇔ pS (x, v)  ≥  pS (y, v) [2.6] 
where LS(v) is a preorder on S; that is LS(v) satisfies the properties of completeness [2.7] and 
transitivity [2.8]: 
∀ x, y ∈ S, x LS(v) y or y LS(v) x  [2.7] 
∀ x, y, z ∈ S, x LS(v) y and y LS(v) z  ⇒ x LS(v) z  [2.8] 
In most cases, when Hume refers to pleasure as a magnitude, he gives us evidence that 
we are in a situation which allows [2.6] to be true. Hence on the one hand, arguing that in a 
given context of choice we are entitled to associate a given amount of pleasure (expressed by 
a real number) to each element of S, amounts to saying that between two elements of S, we 
are always able to determine which one pleases us the most (completeness). On the other hand 
if a first element pleases us at least as much as a second, and if this second element pleases us 
at least as much as a third, then the first element pleases us at least as much as the third 
(transitivity). This is all the more so that property 2 above is satisfied, and that pleasure 
appears as a cardinal magnitude. But in some other cases, although his vocabulary remains the 
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same, Hume seems to express something rather different, so that the existence of pS (x, v) and, 
as a result, the existence and the properties of LS(v) become much more disputable. 
An interesting example can be found in a previously quoted passage of the Treatise, at 
the end of the section of the first Book of the Treatise dedicated to the “probability of causes”, 
in which Hume discusses “minute differences” between probabilities. He imagined what we 
would call a “lottery” (x1, x2; prob1, prob2), where prob1 = 10000/20001 and prob2 = 1-prob1 
= 10001/20001: 
“My […] reflection is founded on those large probabilities which the mind can judge of, and the minute 
differences it can observe betwixt them. When the chances or experiments on one side amount to ten 
thousand, and on the other to ten thousand and one […] it is plainly impossible for the mind to run over 
every particular view, and distinguish the superior vivacity of the image arising from the superior 
number, where the difference is so inconsiderable.” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 141). 
Hume’s argument on the impossibility for the mind to “run over every particular view, and 
distinguish the superior vivacity of the image arising from the superior number” is based on a 
fundamental mechanism, first built in the context of the “probabilities of chances”, and then 
extended to the “probabilities of causes”. They respectively correspond roughly to the a priori 
calculus of chances, usually illustrated by examples drawn from gambling, and to the 
statistical judgement, which infers predictions on the class to which belongs such character 
from past observations concerning the distribution of characters between classes. 
It was in order to give new evidence which would favour his argumentation that Hume 
shifted from the analysis of relations concerning ideas towards such relations concerning 
impressions of sensation (pleasure and pain) or of reflection (passions). “We have a parallel 
instance in the affections”, he said (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 141). Instead of “numbers” referring 
to probabilities, we now have “numbers” representing quantities of impressions which, in 
turn, refer to quantities of objects. Hume then suggested a simple arithmetic of passions, in 
which a large “compounded” passion comes from “a great number of weaker passions, 
derived from a view of each part of the object” (ibid.), and pointed out a principle similar to 
the one which prevails in the probability of causes: 
“Yet nothing can be more certain than that so small a difference [Hume’s example concerns the desire 
for one pound more out of one thousand; M.-A.D. and A.L.] wou’d not be discernible in the passions, 
nor cou’d render them distinguishable from each other.” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 141). 
As a result, Hume argued, although “[t]he mind can perceive, from its immediate feeling, that 
three guineas produce a greater passion than two”, it cannot perceive any distinguishable 
sensation between one thousand guineas and nine hundred and ninety-nine guineas (Hume 
1739-40, I, p. 141-2). 
A seemingly obvious interpretation leads one to infer from the above passage that 
Hume assumed an initially positive decreasing marginal pleasure, which becomes constant 
from the point where it is equal to zero. This obvious interpretation supports, as above (see 
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property 2, [2.5]), the idea that Hume had in view what we would call a “concave” pleasure 
function. However, there is something more in this example. Hume also argued that we are 
usually facing what is today called “indiscrimination problems” whose weight is all the more 
important when we are dealing with smaller relative differences between the objects 
compared to each other (Lapidus 2000, pp. 49-51). The question of indiscrimination is now 
familiar in decision theory, at least since R. Luce (1956). From the point of view of Hume’s 
example, an important consequence of the indiscrimination problem on which he laid 
emphasis would be that, for instance, 1000 guineas would provide neither more nor less 
pleasure than 999, 1001 than 1000, 1002 than 1001, etc… whereas 1009 guineas would give 
more pleasure than, let us say, 999. But such a use of the expressions “more pleasure” or “less 
pleasure” can only be metaphorical, since in this case, pleasure as a magnitude determined by 
a pleasure function like in [2.1], might merely not exist. This can be explained more formally. 
The pleasure relation LS(v) can be considered as the union of its asymmetric part 
PLS(v) and its symmetric part ILS(v) of LS(v), defined as follows: 
PLS(v) = {(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ LS(v) and (y, x) ∉ LS(v)}  
ILS(v) = {(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ LS(v) and (y, x) ∈LS(v)} [2.9] 
LS(v) = PLS(v) ∪ ILS(v) (whereas PLS(v) ∩ ILS(v) = ∅) 
Hume’s example of indiscrimination between 999 and 1000 guineas did not challenge the 
asymmetric part PLS(v): this latter is clearly transitive, just as it would be if no discrimination 
problem occurs. But such is not the case with the symmetric part ILS(v): we may find 
sequences (x1, x2), (x2, x3), … (xn-1, xn) ∈ ILS(v) although (x1, xn) ∈ PLS(v)1. The property of 
transitivity [2.8] of the pleasure relation LS(v) should therefore be restricted to its asymmetric 
part only, so that it is said to be only “quasi-transitive”: 
∀ x, y, z ∈ S, x PLS(v) y and y PLS(v) z  ⇒ x PLS(v) z [2.10] 
Since LS(v) satisfies [2.7] and [2.10], it is a complete quasi-transitive relation. And it is now 
well known that in this case, no scalar function like pS(x, v) can represent LS(v). This is why 
we argued that the reference to such or such amount of pleasure in order to denote, like in the 
standard situation of perfect discrimination, the impressions associated to various amounts of 
goods, can only be metaphorical. It seems that Hume was employing a vocabulary which 
matches the literary description of a functional relation – the function of pleasure – in a 
situation where such a functional relation cannot exist. 
                                                 
1 For instance, (999, 1000), (1000, 1001), … (1008, 1009) ∈ ILS(v), but (999, 1009) ∉ ILS(v) since (1009, 999) 
∈ PLS(v). 
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Rigorously speaking, instead of a pleasure function pS(x, v), it is a pleasure 
correspondence πS(x, v) that Hume’s example would suggest – that is, a mapping of the 
context of choice S, into the set of subsets (in this case, closed intervals) of the quantities of 
pleasure: 
πS(x, v) = [aS(x, v), bS(x, v)] [2.11] 
(where x ∈ S and [aS(x, v), bS(x, v)] is an interval in R) 
[2.11] amounts to saying that the pleasure of x is not a single point, let us say pS(x, v), but is 
located within an interval closed by a minimum aS(x, v) and a maximum bS(x, v) of pleasure. 
Let us remember that a closed interval I1 (included in R) is greater than another closed 
interval I2 (also included in R) denoted I1>> I2 if any element from I2 is strictly higher (>) 
than any element from I1 : whatever α1 belonging to I1 and α2 belonging to I2, α1 > α2. In 
order to simplify the notation and if there is no risk of confusion, we write I1> I2 instead of 
I1>> I2. Henceforth, the pleasure correspondence πS(x, v) in [2.11] represents the pleasure 
relation LS(v) in the following way:  
∀ x, y ∈ S, x ILS(v) y ⇒ πS(x, v) ∩ πS(y, v) ≠ ∅ [2.12] 
∀ x, y ∈ S, x PLS(v) y ⇒ πS(x, v) > πS(y, v) [2.13] 
[2.12] means that the individual is indifferent in terms of pleasure between bundles x and y if 
the maximum of pleasure associated with x, bS(x, v), is between the minimum of pleasure 
associated with y, aS(y, v) and the maximum of pleasure associated with y, bS(y, v). Likewise, 
according to equation [2.13], x pleases strictly more than y to the individual if the minimum of 
pleasure associated with x, aS(x, v),  is greater than the maximum of pleasure associated with 
y, bS(y, v). Moreover, it seems obvious that the monotony property [2.2] of the pleasure 
function be extended to the correspondence of pleasure so that, if the bundle x is greater than 
the bundle y, the lower and the upper bounds of πS(x, v) are greater than the corresponding 
bounds of πS(y, v): 
∀ x, y ∈ S, x > y ⇒ aS(x, v) > aS(y, v) and bS(x, v) > bS(y, v) [2.14]. 
3. BELIEF, PLEASURE, AND THE WAY TO ACTION 
3.1. A Sophisticated Hedonism 
The construction, in contemporary decision theory, of decision patterns based on 
complete quasi-transitive preferences, seems to open the path to a similar issue concerning 
Hume’s decision process. This issue would have made possible carrying on with the parallel 
between Hume and Bentham. However, such a path is barred and the parallel with Bentham 
cannot be continued any longer. To put it briefly, this comes from the divergence between, on 
the one hand, the pleasure relation LS(v) or the correspondence of pleasure πS(x, v) which 
represents it, and, on the other hand, a desire binary relation RS(v) on S which denotes 
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individual preferences. In other words, and this time in sharp contrast to Bentham, what 
pleases us the most from a Humean point of view is usually not what we desire the most. This 
is not enough to give up the idea that Hume’s theory of action comes within psychological 
hedonism, but it is clearly enough to consider it a sophisticated hedonism.  
This question may be tackled through one of the best known passages of the Treatise, 
in which Hume gave instances of the inability of reason to arbitrate between alternative ends 
of passions – as long as they are neither “founded on false suppositions” nor choose “means 
insufficient for the end”: 
“‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 
‘Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian, or 
person wholly unknown to me.” (Hume 1739-40, II, p. 416). 
Hume does not mention explicitly here pleasure or pain. Nonetheless, we could conclude from 
these two provocative examples, systematically quoted in the literature on Hume’s theory of 
morals, that what is preferred or chosen (Hume’s vocabulary is far from definite) in each 
situation is also what would provide the greatest pleasure (or, rather, the smallest pain): the 
destruction of the world in one case, my ruin in the other. But the following sentences lead us 
to qualify this interpretation: 
“‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and 
have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain 
circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment.” 
(Ibid.). 
There is no doubt that the “good” mentioned by Hume stands for “pleasure”1, so that it is 
obvious that Hume means that we might as well follow our pleasure or go against it2. 
However, the way Hume illustrates the possible contradiction between pleasure and 
preferences is far from fully satisfactory:  
“[There is not] any thing more extraordinary in this”, Hume continued, “than in mechanics to see one 
pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation” (Ibid.).  
Although rather obscure, this mechanical analogy leads us to question the nature of the 
suggested lever arm, the “advantage” of the situation, which allows pleasure to determine 
desire and will on the one hand, and to be ordered differently on the other hand.  
                                                 
1 In various instances, when discussing the origin of direct passions, Hume was quite specific in pointing out 
that  “good and evil” are, “in other words, pain and pleasure” (Hume 1739-40, II, p. 439). Both the Treatise  
and the Dissertation make clear that for Hume, the words “pleasure”, “good”, “agreement” were synonymous 
as impressions of sensation, just like “pain”, “evil”, and “disagreement”. 
2 Only the two first situations of choice among the three involved in this passage ((1) the destruction of the 
world; (2) my ruin; (3) my lesser good) are usually discussed in the literature. Cass Weller 2004 is a notable 
exception, since he also discusses the third situation.  
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The location of the answer is quite familiar to Hume scholars. Indeed, it is well-known 
that in situations of choice, the pleasure which activates the direct passions that are the closest 
to action (desire, aversion, and will) stands not as an “impression of sensation” (using Hume’s 
vocabulary) but as an “idea” derived from this impression: 
“But pain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of which the one has 
effects very different from the other. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling, or only 
in idea, as at present when I mention them.” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 118). 
Now, it is also well-known from Hume’s theory of ideas developed in Book I of the Treatise 
that an idea as such, as a mere conception, cannot cause any action even if its correlate is a 
very intense impression: 
“‘Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far from being equal. Impressions always actuate 
the soul and that in the highest degree; but ‘tis not every idea which has the same effect” (Ibid.)  
Hume thus held that the idea would borrow force and vivacity from the original 
impression1 in order to cause action. The pleasure which is related to such good as an original 
impression might thus be very high; but it will not lead on to volition, able to result in action, 
if the idea of this high pleasure is not strong enough. Now, the strength of the idea is precisely 
what Hume called a “belief”: “A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT 
IMPRESSION” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 96). He explained in detail that our lives would be 
unbearable if either impressions or ideas alone influence our will (Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 118-
9). The “castle-builder” to which he referred frequently, presumably attaches an intense 
impression of pleasure to the results of his “loose reveries”2. But the resulting idea remains an 
“idle fiction”, a fancy of his imagination, which would never influence his will. On the 
contrary,  
“[…] the ideas of those objects which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser 
degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and 
perception. The effect then of belief, is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and 
bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an 
impression in force and vivacity.” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 119). 
Belief hence appears as the appropriate candidate for the ‘lever arm’ for which we 
were searching. Its birth is a complicated operation – for which Hume remained so unsatisfied 
that he devoted half of the Appendix to the Treatise to it, published jointly to Book III in 
                                                 
1 The Enquiry is not as clear as the Treatise in considering that an impression “communicates a share of its force 
and vivacity” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 98). It only states that the force of a conception is “derived” from a present 
impression (Hume 1748, p. 54). The thesis of an evolution on this point from the time when Hume was writing 
Book I of the Treatise, to the Appendix published one year after the two first books, and to the Enquiry on 
Human Understanding was brilliantly supported by Francis Dauer 1999. 
2 Hume 1739-40, I, p. 97. The example of the “castle-builder” reappears in the Appendix to the Treatise (Hume 
1739-40, A, pp.  624; 625) where it meets the one of an “enchanted castle” (Hume 1739-40, A, p. 625), also 
present in the Enquiry (Hume 1748, p. 50). 
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1740, one year after Books I and II, which involves custom, general rules, and natural 
relations. 
It can be observed that the numerous examples, scattered in Hume’s writings, which 
show a possible discrepancy between pleasure and desire or will, usually refer to “custom and 
practice […] [which] must certainly […] guide us, by means of general establish’d maxims, in 
the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another” (Hume 1739-40, II, 
p. 294). Now, “custom” is not a trifling word in Hume’s system. What he called indifferently 
“custom” or “habit”1 is a touchstone in the explanation of inductive inference, of which it is 
well-known that he claimed it could not be rationally justified. It is a touchstone because:  
1. it preserves the reasonings from experience from sceptical doubts, and goes over them, 
henceforth allowing this “science of man” that Hume was willing to build2;  
2. as the “great guide of human life”, as Hume (1748, p. 44) called it, “custom” is also a 
condition for goal-oriented action and for the natural sciences3. 
On this account, custom is not an external principle, sociological for example, but a 
principle of the mind that, jointly with the principle of experience, transfers the past to the 
future without delay or deliberate effort (“[t]he custom operates before we have time for 
reflexion”, Hume (1739-40, I, p. 104) said), and makes us form ideas concerning matters of 
fact in a more intense manner: 
“Experience is a principle which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is 
another principle which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to 
operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner than 
                                                 
1 However, one may observe a slight difference, “custom” denoting at times the process of which “habit” is the 
result. 
2 This point is presented, for instance, in section V of the first Enquiry: “Nor need we fear, that this philosophy 
[academic or sceptical philosophy], while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever 
undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as 
speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning 
whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section [on sceptical doubts 
concerning the operations of the understanding], that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by 
the mind, which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger, that 
these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the 
mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal 
weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same.” 
(Hume 1748, pp. 41-2). 
3 “It is that principle alone, which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a 
similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should 
be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We 
should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any 
effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.” (Hume 1748, 
pp. 44-5; see also ibid., p. 55). 
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others which are not attended with the same advantages. Without this quality, by which the mind 
enlivens some ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on reason), we 
could never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects which are present to 
our senses.” (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 265). 
 This feature is the effect of custom. It does not only make us pass from such past or 
present impressions or ideas to such future ideas but it also endows these ideas with more or 
less force or vivacity where certain demonstrative knowledge is missing. In other words, it 
makes them a belief. 
3.2. The Lever-Arm: Belief, and Pleasure as an Idea 
For Hume, belief lays on some intermediary area between impressions, to which it is 
said, at least in the Treatise, that it borrows force and vivacity (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 98), and 
ideas standing as mere conceptions, for which force and vivacity are meaningless. If we trust 
Hume’s vocabulary, my belief can be more or less vivid, like an impression. But it does not 
mean that it is an impression, since it aims at being true or false, and not at being satisfied, let 
us say, like a desire. Nor is it an idea since, for instance, my belief that it will rain this 
afternoon might be vivid or weak, or even true or false: it does not change anything to my 
mere idea of a rainy afternoon1. If I take an umbrella, it is not because of this idea of a rainy 
afternoon; and it is even not because of my belief that it will rain alone: it is because of a) my 
desire to remain dry, and b) my belief that the afternoon will be rainy, and, of course, c) my 
belief that an umbrella will give me appropriate shelter. 
The vocabulary used by Hume to denote a belief2 – “vivacity”, “vividness”, 
“strength”, “force”, etc… – nonetheless remains metaphoric and unclear concerning the 
nature of what is denoted. Moreover, it looks like multi-purpose vocabulary. The same words 
are used, (i) to establish a distinction between impressions and ideas (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 2; 
p. 19), (ii) to explain what is transferred from an impression to produce a belief (Ibid., pp. 96; 
153), (iii) to contrast a belief and a fiction of the imagination (Hume 1739-40, A, p. 629), (iv) 
                                                 
1 Since it is not an idea, belief is all the more so not some kind of new idea, attached to a former conception. 
Hume clearly held that there is no novelty in belief (see, for instance, Hume 1739-40, A, p. 626; 1740, p. 653), 
and that it only consists in a peculiar conception, stronger and more vivid (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 96; 1748, 
p. 49).  
2 In the Abstract, Hume recapitulated the synonyms he used to characterize a belief: “He [Hume] calls it 
sometimes a stronger conception, sometimes a more lively, a more vivid, a firmer, or a more intense 
conception.” (Hume 1740, p. 654). A similar enumeration can be found in the Appendix to the Treatise (Hume 
1739-40, A, p. 629), and later in the first Enquiry: “I say then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, 
forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain.” (Hume 
1748, p. 49). 
Marc-Arthur Diaye and André Lapidus – Pleasure and Belief in Hume’s Decision Process 
13.05.2010 - 15:43 
17
to distinguish memories and imagination (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 9; p. 85). And, (v) when our 
belief is as “vivid” as possible, it allows us to reach the highest reachable level of certainty 
concerning matters of fact. But, facing a demonstrative knowledge which entails an absolute 
certainty like, for instance, when we say that the three angles of a triangle equal two right 
angles (Hume 1739-40, I, p. 166), we do not encounter anything which corresponds to this 
kind of vivacity. Still more, as Kemp Smith (1941, pp. 169-73) first pointed out, (vi) a similar 
transfer mechanism of vivacity is implicated in the working of sympathy (Hume 1739-40, II, 
p. 317).  
These problems are rather familiar to most modern commentators of Hume, and it is 
not obvious that the same notions of “force and vivacity” be involved in each of these six 
cases. For instance, Trudy Govier (1972) distinguishes the terms denoting “force” from those 
denoting “vivacity”, and attributes the former to the difference between conception and belief, 
and to the difference between imagination and memories, whereas the latter corresponds to 
the difference between idea and impression. Wayne Waxman (1993) opposed two axes of 
differentiation of the perceptions, the first one in terms of the qualities of these perceptions, 
and the second in terms of the qualities of our consciousness of these perceptions – which 
allow him to bring together the “vivacity” of a belief and “verisimilitude”, that is, to some 
sense of truth. And Francis Dauer (1999) associates the distinction between impressions and 
ideas to a sense of presentedness, memory and ideas to a sense of recognition, and belief and 
conception to an adverbial modification of conceiving (a “belief that p” meaning “believingly 
conceiving p”). We will enter neither the debate on the meaning of the terms used by Hume to 
characterize a belief, nor the associated debate on the consistency of Hume’s theories of 
impressions, ideas, and belief. But the very existence of these debates shows that, in spite of 
what Hume sometimes seemed to argue, “force and vivacity” are technical terms, which 
entertain only loose relations to usual language. And of course, the same can be said about 
“belief”. In Book I of the Treatise, Hume regards “belief” as self-explainable. But the 
Appendix reconsiders the question, so that it has become clear that “belief” also be a technical 
term, not identical to its current meaning, and from an economist’s point of view, not identical 
to its standard interpretation in the theory of decision as a probability.  
This rather unusual meaning of “belief” might be reached by focusing on the way it is 
built up, when the force and vivacity of an impression are transferred to an idea. This is the 
role of what Hume called the “natural relations”: resemblance, contiguity, and causality (see 
Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 10-3; 1748, pp. 23-4). They are so fundamental to the operations of our 
minds that, commenting on his own previous work, he was to refer to them as “the cement of 
the universe” (Hume 1740, p. 662). Fundamental, these three relations are not, however, 
equally decisive. Hume devoted the whole Section IX of Book I, Part III of the Treatise to 
convince his reader that whereas causality establishes a sort of conduit that allows the vivacity 
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of a present impression to be transferred to an idea1, resemblance or contiguity alone cannot 
constitute such a conduit, though they can enhance or mitigate sometimes spectacularly the 
force and vivacity of the correlated idea2. It should be stressed that these natural relations only 
associate ideas. They are distinct from the relations of same names presented as 
“philosophical relations” (Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 69-78), which depend on the particular 
circumstance by which we deliberately compare two ideas “without a connecting principle” 
(Ibid.: 14). On the contrary, with regard to natural relations, our mind slides from one object 
to another without any deliberate effort. A belief comes to our mind like this: custom links an 
idea to an impression by way of the natural relations of causality, resemblance, or contiguity3; 
and this idea is given a part of the force and vivacity of the original impression4.  
We already noticed that the lever arm which, for Hume (1739-40, II, p. 416), allows a 
“one pound weight” (a lesser impression of pleasure) to “raise up a hundred” pounds (a 
greater desire), is a belief. This can be made more explicit. Belief works like a lever arm in 
that pleasure is applied to it, and according to the resulting vivacity of the idea of pleasure (its 
length, as a lever-arm), it activates direct passions close enough to action, just like in 
mechanics a force lifts up a weight. And since belief depends on the natural relations, the 
structure of pleasure as an impression will be transformed according to these natural relations 
in order to produce different structures of the direct passions. 
From the point of view of the decision process, the lever arm of belief, which transfers 
pleasure to the direct passions according to its length, raises two different questions. 
                                                 
1 F. Dauer 1999 described this kind of relation between impressions, beliefs and ideas as a “hydraulic model” 
which would not survive the Treatise, and would be accordingly missing from the Enquiry. 
2 Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 106 sqq. Concerning the asymmetric roles of causality, on the one hand, and 
resemblance and contiguity, on the other hand, see Harold Noonan 1999, pp. 73-5.  
3 The importance of the natural relations from the point of view of Hume’s theory of choice was already 
emphasized when dealing with the connection between the elements of a context of choice (Diaye and Lapidus 
2005a, pp. 96-7), and with the “double relation”, of impression and of idea, which generates the dynamics of 
passions (Ibid., 100-1; see also Sugden 2005, pp. 115-6, and Diaye and Lapidus 2005b, p. 121). 
4 Though belief establishes a link from past to future, it does not amount to a simple partial transfer: the past is 
also transformed, by means of “general rules” discussed in Book I, Part III, Section XV of the Treatise (Hume 
1739-40, I, pp. 173-6). These general rules might today appear obsolete. But beyond this little generous 
appreciation, general rules constitute a two stages device (Gilles Deleuze 1953, p. 30 distinguished “extensive” 
and “corrective” rules; a similar idea can be found in Thomas Hearn 1970, Marie Martin 1993, Lapidus 2000, 
pp. 41n, 66-8) which i) allows extending the domain of custom beyond the simple repetition of the past, and ii) 
gives some principles in order to control this extent. And such characteristics, of course, are far from obsolete. 
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The first one deals with the passion involved in the distortion of pleasure, at the 
extremity of a chain of emotions and beliefs. Hume had described the way this chain is 
constructed, though his aim was, again, to stress the limited role of reason: 
“‘Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent 
emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness 
or satisfaction. ‘Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every 
side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and 
effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, 
our actions receive a subsequent variation. But ‘tis evident, in this case, that the impulse arises not from 
reason, but is only directed by it. It is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or 
propensity arises towards any object: and these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of 
that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience.” (Hume 1739-40, II, p. 414). 
It is easy to understand that the successive beliefs which separate, for instance, my backache 
from last week end when I tried to cut the grass, and my buying a rowing machine, have, at 
each step, transferred more or less of the vivacity of the impression of pain that I endeavour to 
avoid onto the corresponding passion. At the end of the process, my desires and will have 
been affected in proportion. More formally, this means that the already noted pleasure relation 
LS(v) which underlies the correspondence of pleasure π(x, v) is transformed by belief into a 
desire binary relation RS(v). 
The second question raised by the transfer of pleasure to the direct passions deals with 
the natural relation whose role is favoured in the birth of belief. Three kinds of transformation 
of the structure of pleasures can be distinguished, according to the corresponding natural 
relation – causality, resemblance, and contiguity – favoured by the process. 
(1). Causality is always involved in the transfer of pleasure to desire, if only because belief is 
an effect of custom that rests on general rules, which themselves concern causality. But it 
is more particularly involved in the working of what Hume called “mixtures of passions”, 
namely “hope” and “fear” where joy or grief are respectively dominant. These mixtures 
of passions lead to an analysis of choice under uncertainty, of which several features are 
given in Book II, Part III, Section IX of the Treatise, devoted to direct passions (Hume 
1739-40, II, pp. 439 sqq.), in the first section of the Dissertation on the same subject 
(Hume 1757, pp. 139 sqq.), and in the numerous passages of both the Treatise and the 
first Enquiry which concern probability (specially, Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 124 sqq.; Hume 
1748, pp. 56-9). The resulting desire appears as a transformation of the pleasure and pain 
involved in the mixed passions. 
(2). The effect of contiguity, either in space or in time, is approached through several 
passages, in Book II of the Treatise (Hume 1739-40, II, pp. 418 sqq, 427 sqq, 432 sqq), in 
the second Enquiry (Hume 1751, pp. 239-40), and in the Dissertation (Hume 1757, 
pp. 161-2). This provides a key to Hume’s approach to both intertemporal and spatial 
decision, like in Lapidus 2010, where it is shown that the belief in the idea of the pleasure 
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of a future good (the desire for this good) is negatively linked to the degree of violence of 
the passion, on which depends the action of the natural relation of contiguity. 
(3). A remarkable effect of resemblance on the way pleasure is transferred to desire and 
volition is presented at the end of a discussion on probability in book I of the Treatise 
(Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 141-2). The procedure that is involved suggests a solution to the 
already mentioned problem of indiscrimination between impressions of pleasure. 
The principle which governs these three topics remains the same: the strength of an 
idea (the “belief”), related to an impression of pleasure or pain varies when transferred onto 
desire and volition. The different origins of this variation (respectively: causality, resemblance 
or contiguity) correspond to separate fields in contemporary theory of decision (decision 
under uncertainty, indiscrimination, intertemporal and spatial decision) which thus appear, 
from a Humean point of view, closer to each other than it is usually acknowledged. From now 
on, it is obvious that “belief” should be understood in what we already called a technical 
sense, nonetheless different from the one which is employed in standard decision theory. We 
would hardly say, in usual language, that the resolution of a problem of indiscrimination, 
which involves resemblance, produces a belief; and in the same way, in regards to choice 
theory, it seems difficult to say that we believe less in a future good when no uncertainty 
occurs. However, all these cases refer to beliefs, in a Humean sense. 
The juncture between the natural relation centrally involved in the formation of belief 
(1), (2) or (3) and the corresponding topic in decision theory is summarised below. 
Natural relations Topics and sources 
   (1) Causality 
Decision under risk or uncertainty 
(Hume 1739-40, II, pp. 439 sqq; 
1757, pp. 139 sqq.) 
 (2) Contiguity  
Intertemporal and spatial decision 
(Hume 1739-40, II, pp. 418-22, 
427-38; 1751, pp. 239-40; 1757, 
pp. 161-2) 
(3) Resemblance Indiscrimination (Hume 1739-40, I, pp. 141-2) 
 
The origins of belief in the formation of decision 
This suggests that for each topic, belief might formally operate in a similar way in 
order to transform pleasure into desire. Whatever the natural relation mainly involved, the 
original pleasure relation LS(v) is, let us say, scrambled by belief in order to give birth to 
RS(v). In the case of the relation of contiguity, for instance, belief possibly changes the order 
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between such elements x and y, when moving from LS(v) to RS(v). Hume gives some general 
features of the procedure involved, which favours several kinds of dependencies of the 
relative places of two desirable objects, through contiguity itself, violence of the passion, 
memory, date, or target effects. Similar instances might be provided by causality alone, or 
resemblance.  
Generally speaking, this procedure gives rise to a non-empty class of desire relations, 
shaped by beliefs resting on causality, contiguity, or resemblance, among which at least one is 
transitive. Although it is not self-evident, these desire relations RS(v), which appear as the 
outcome of the belief on the pleasure relation in a context S, are linked to the ones which were 
used to denote contextual preferences RS in Diaye and Lapidus 2005a (the precise 
characteristics of the emotional state, given by v, was omitted), and whose completeness on S 
was established (Diaye and Lapidus 2005a, pp. 96-97). In this last paper, it was only assumed 
that contextual preferences RS, which were not necessarily transitive at each step of a decision 
process denoted D-PROC, were changing and were revised all along this process, till the 
moment when they became stabilised and, as a result, transitive (Ibid., proposition 2, p. 106). 
The link between the desire relations RS(v) which stem from pleasure and belief, and the 
contextual preferences in D-PROC might be expressed through the following condition: 
Density condition 
The set of contexts of choice faced by the individual is dense with respect to D-PROC, 
that is for any RS(v) there exists a sequence of revision of preferences in D-PROC of 
which it is an outcome  [3.1]  
Under this density condition, it is clear that preferences remain, at each step, shaped 
by belief on the basis of the relation of pleasure. Indeed, for any preference relation RS(v), the 
density condition implies that there always exists a sequence of contextual sets S0, S1, …Si, …   
such that applying D-PROC over this sequence leads to a general preference R over S0∪S1∪ 
…∪Si∪.., whose restriction over S coincides with RS(v).  
In the following subsection, this quite general procedure is illustrated by the working 
of the natural relation of resemblance in order to solve indiscrimination problems. 
3.3. From Pleasure to Desire: Solving an Indiscrimination Problem 
When dealing with what he called “minute differences” between amounts of money, 
Hume opened the path to an apparently simple way to solve the associate problem of 
indiscrimination between close impressions, using the natural relation of resemblance. 
Hume’s procedure is introduced as follows: 
“The difference, therefore, of our conduct in preferring the greater number depends not upon our 
passions, but upon custom and general rules. We have found in a multitude of instances that the 
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augmenting the numbers of any sum augments the passion, where the numbers are precise and the 
difference sensible. The mind can perceive, from its immediate feeling, that three guineas produce a 
greater passion than two; and this it transfers to larger numbers, because of the resemblance; and by a 
general rule assigns to a thousand guineas a stronger passion than to nine hundred and ninety-nine.” 
(Hume 1739-40, I: 141-142). 
It is assumed in this example that we are facing a simple context of choice S = {2; 3; 
999; 1000} included in R+. Considering v as given, the correspondence of pleasure is such 
that  
π(1000, v) ∩ π(999, v) ≠ ∅ 
π(999, v) > π(3, v) > π(2, v),  
and π(1000, v) > π(3, v) > π(2, v). 
In terms of the underlying pleasure relation LS(v), this means that 
(999, 3), (999, 2), (1000, 3), (1000, 2), (3, 2) ∈ PLS(v) 
whereas (999, 1000) ∈ ILS(v). 
Based on the resemblance of the differences between 3 and 2 guineas, and between 
1000 and 999 guineas, Hume’s procedure leads to believe more in the idea of the pleasure 
associated with 1000 than in the one associated with 999 guineas, in spite of the fact that our 
mind cannot discriminate between the correlate impressions of pleasure. This amounts to 
transform the pleasure relation LS(v) into a complete order of desire RS(v) as follows, (PRS(v) 
denoting the asymmetric part of RS(v)) : 
(999, 3), (999, 2), (1000, 3), (1000, 2), (3, 2), (1000, 999) ∈ PRS(v) 
And, of course, RS(v) can be represented by a scalar function u(x, v): 
u(1000, v) > u(999, v) > u(3, v) > u(2, v) 
In the elementary case of a single good that, like an amount of money, varies in 
quantities, Hume’s procedure makes it possible to cancel out the consequences of 
indiscrimination by transforming the quasi-transitive pleasure relation into a class of desire 
relations which contains a single element, which is a preorder of desire. However, the 
principle on which this simple procedure rests is more general. It amounts to construct desire 
relations RS(v) (subsets of Rn+×Rn+) on the basis of the pleasure relation LS(v) by adding or 
subtracting some structures, and to show that at least one of these relations is a preorder.  
 
This more general resemblance-belief procedure is described by [3.2] and [3.3]: 
• PLS(v) ⊆ PRS(v) [3.2] 
(that is, the asymmetric part of the desire relation includes the asymmetric part of the 
pleasure relation).  
• ∀ (x, y) ∈ ILS(v),  
if ∃ (z, t) ∈ S² with (z, t) ∈ PLS(v) and x-y ≥ z-t > 0, then (x, y) ∈ PRS(v)  [3.3] 
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(this extends Hume’s example to the case where, for instance, S = {1, 2, 10000, 
10001.1}). 
Allowing [3.1], [3.2], and [3.3], the proposition and the corollary hereafter can be 
established: 
Proposition  
Let LS(v) be a complete quasi-transitive pleasure relation on S, which is represented by 
an underlying correspondence of pleasure πS(x, v) = [aS(x, v), bS(x, v)] (see [2.11] 
above), so that for all  x, y ∈ S, x ILS(v) y ⇒ πS(x, v) ∩ πS(y, v) ≠ ∅, and x PLS(v) y ⇒ 
πS(x, v) > πS(y, v) ([2.12] and [2.13] above), the monotony condition [2.14] being 
satisfied. The class of desire relations RS(v) derived from a pleasure relation LS(v) and 
fulfilling conditions [3.2] and [3.3] is not empty. Moreover it includes at least one 
preorder. 
Proof : Because of [2.14], it is possible to construct at least one RS(v) = PRS(v) ∪ IRS(v) in the 
following way: 
∀ x, y ∈ S, x PRS(v) y only if aS(x, v) > aS(y, v)  
∀ x, y ∈ S, x IRS(v) y only if aS(x, v) = aS(y, v)  
Let us show that the resulting desire relation RS(v) satisfies [3.2] and [3.3].  
• Let x, y ∈ S. x PLS(v) y ⇒ πS(x, v) = [aS(x, v), bS(x, v)] > πS(y, v) = [aS(y, v), bS(y, v)]. As 
a consequence, aS(x, v) > aS(y, v). Hence by construction of RS(v), we have x PRS(v) y. 
This shows that [3.2] is satisfied. 
• Let (x, y) ∈ ILS(v). Suppose that ∃ (z, t) ∈ S² with z PLS(v) t and x-y ≥ z-t > 0, then x > y. 
By monotony condition [2.14], we have aS(x, v) > aS(y, v) and bS(x, v) > bS(y, v). And by 
construction of RS(v), we have (x, y) ∈ PRS(v). This shows that [3.3] is satisfied. 
Let us now show that this desire relation RS(v) is a preorder.  
• It is obviously complete because it is constructed from LS(v) which is complete.  
• It is also transitive. To see this, let us remark that the symmetric part of RS(v), namely 
IRS(v) is clearly transitive because for all  x, y ∈ S, x IRS(v) y only if aS(x, v) = aS(y, v). 
The asymmetric part of RS(v), namely PRS(v) is also transitive because for all  x, y ∈ S, x 
PRS(v) y only if aS(x, v) > aS(y, v).  
■ 
Corollary 
Suppose that the conditions stated in the above proposition and density condition [3.1] 
are satisfied. There exists a preorder RS(v) that belongs to the class of desire relations 
transformed by belief from the pleasure relation, and which constitutes an issue of D-
PROC. 
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Proof :  According to the above proposition, there exists a preorder RS(v) that belongs to the 
class of desire relations transformed by belief from the pleasure relation. However according 
to condition 3.1], there exists a sequence of revision of preferences in D-PROC of which 
RS(v) is an outcome.  
■ 
Both the proposition and the corollary above express the embedment between the 
operation of belief that transforms pleasure into desire, and the decision process that possibly 
gives rise to the rationality of the latter and of the associated choice. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Hume’s approach opens the path to a serious challenge to our current understanding of 
the decision process. The reason is not that standard categories and topics suddenly become 
meaningless: rationality, functional representation of preferences, on the one hand, or 
intertemporal decision, choice indiscrimination, decision under risk or uncertainty, on the 
other hand, all remain relevant. But they are not relevant in the same way.  
Rationality, in the technical meaning of rationality of choice and preferences, gives 
birth to a more qualified approach. It is now considered not as a prerequisite, directly derived 
from a given set of axioms, but as a possible and interpretable outcome of a decision process. 
Moreover, the usual question of the functional representation of preferences is inverted. 
Instead of a convenient representation through a function of utility, which does not mean 
anything else than the underlying preorder of preferences, Hume’s work puts forward an 
alternative approach where pleasure, considered as the value of a pleasure function or 
correspondence, expresses and transforms itself into a desire relation that displays the usual 
characteristics of a preference relation. As a result, desire has content in terms of pleasure, 
even if this content is not monotonously reflected in desire, whereas in standard analysis, 
utility represents preferences without possessing any specific content. 
But such an operation is possible only because we accept the idea of some general 
device, which connects our pleasures and pains to our desires and aversions. This is precisely 
the role that is granted, from a Humean point of view, to belief. Through what Hume called 
the “natural relations” of the mind, belief unifies topics that we are used to considering 
separate. The belief that we add to the idea of a pleasure associated with an object distant in 
space or time, to the achievement of a risky event, or to an object so close to another that the 
discrimination power of our senses does not allow us to distinguish between them, performs 
in all these cases a similar operation: drawing on a structure of pleasure, it transforms this 
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latter into a structure of desire. As a result, Hume’s challenge meets a recurrent ulterior 
motive in decision theory: providing a missing unifying principle.  
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce explicitly pleasure and belief in what aims at 
being a Humean theory of decision, like the one developed in Diaye and Lapidus (2005a). 
Although we support the idea that Hume was in some way a hedonist – evidently different 
from Bentham’s or Jevons’ way – we lay emphasis less on continuity than on the specific 
kind of hedonism encountered in Hume’s writings (chiefly the Treatise, the second Enquiry, 
the Dissertation, or some of his Essays). Such hedonism clearly contrasts to its standard 
modern inheritance, expressed by the relation between preferences and utility. 
The reason for such a difference with the usual approach lies in the mental process that 
Hume puts to the fore in order to explain the way pleasure determines desires and volition. 
Whereas pleasure is primarily, in Hume’s words, an impression of sensation, it takes place in 
the birth of passions as reflecting an idea of pleasure, whose “force and vivacity” is precisely 
a “belief”, transferred to the direct passions of desire or volition that come immediately before 
action. As a result, from a Humean point of view, “belief” deals with decision under risk or 
uncertainty, as well with intertemporal decision and indiscrimination problems.  
The latter are explored within a formal framework, and it is shown that the relation of 
pleasure is transformed by belief into a non-empty class of relations of desire, among which at 
least one is a preorder. 
 
 
